As the author concisely states: “This book is a comparative
study of the development of political culture in Europe from the late
seventeenth to the late eighteenth century…the focus is chiefly on Great
Britain, France and the Holy Roman Empire. Its central thesis is that during
this period a new cultural space developed, which posed new challenges to
regimes and their ruling orders. Alongside the old culture, centered on the
courts and the representation of monarchical authority, there emerged a ‘public
sphere’, in which private individuals come together to form a whole greater
than the sum of the parts … ‘public opinion’ came to be recognized as the
ultimate arbiter in matters of taste and politics. These changes presented
regimes with both a challenge and an opportunity” (p. 2).
Tim Blanning’s introductory framework is a restatement of
Jurgen Habermas’s ideas, from The Structural Transformation of the Public
Sphere. But, there are important disagreements between the two. Blanning attempts
to depart from Habermas by “clear[ing] away” his predecessor’s “insistence on
the ‘bourgeois’ nature of the public sphere” and “its allegedly oppositional
orientation” to 18th Century regimes (Blanning, p. 14). That he
fails to clear away either will be explained in the course of this review. But
he does provide a significant history. His examination is richly informative
and applies public sphere theory to an expanded range of political
environments. Habermas focused his initial examination on France. Blanning surveys
France, Britain and the Holy Roman Empire. By doing so, he is able to exhibit
how other early modern authorities dealt differently with this newly formed cultural
space.
An important revelation is that the challenge of the public
sphere did not have to result in violent revolution, as it did in France. Great
Britain was able to adapt to public opinion. It had a monarch who projected a
moral character admired by middle and working class subjects, and a Parliament that
prided itself on liberty to an extent not mirrored in France. There were
factors ignored by Blanning: Part of the island’s advantage over 18th
Century France was in having an economy where, thanks to imperialism and
industrialism, fewer commoners went hungry. While these conditions were immediately
harmful to subjects, slaves and colonies, they gave the government time to acclimatize
to democracy.
The Holy Roman Empire is a more problematic example. Blanning’s
focal point is Frederick II’s Prussia. This historian sees Frederick as
Frederick saw himself: as an enlightened despot. Certainly, Frederick II deserves
credit for fostering the arts, censoring publications less than France did, surrounding
himself with Philosophes and talking a good game. But he didn’t “create” the
Prussian public sphere as Blanning claims (Blanning, p. 227). Neither did he
make “contributions to the formation of a public sphere” (Blanning, p. 223). This
arena was evolving in his nation in spite of monarchy; not because of it. One
should be more judicious in evaluating this king: Frederick allowed “some
freedoms of the press” (Blanning, p. 224). He joined the liberalizing
Freemasons (Blanning, p. 226). He wrote articles that were widely read. Some
credit is due. It may even be true, as the historian claims, that Frederick II
“was a genius…as a political theorist, historian, poet, dramatist, composer and
flautist, he would deserve his niche in any cultural history” (Blanning, p.
227). But a careful reader needs to look past Blanning’s colossal man crush to
examine the workings of power. A monarch has privileges of action and
expression that others do not. The public sphere is an arena of thought
experiments and debate. But the only times that the author quotes someone criticizing
Frederick’s ideas is when that person is outside of Prussia. Moser disagrees
with the king over Shakespeare from the safety of Osnabruck (Blanning, p. 251).
Writers for the Hamburgische Neue Zeitung
dispute Frederick’s evaluation of German literature from their free city
(Blanning, p. 262). No evidence is shown of Prussians debating their
king over literature. Also, what is not publicly spoken is as important as what
is spoken. Literary criticism is one thing, but the menace of authority would
not permit one to excoriate governmental shortcomings in Prussia. Frederick did
not contribute to the growing public sphere; he controlled it in some areas and
usurped unrivaled privileges of expression in others.
Part of the author’s misperception of monarchical government
lies in a basic misunderstanding of power. Blanning’s Introduction states “in
1679, Louis XIV obliged Frederick William…to return to Sweden all the territory
conquered…not by force of arms…but by his aura of authority” (Blanning, p. 5).
Earlier, he says it was “the success of the British and Prussian states in
adapting their political cultures which enabled them to achieve success in war”
(Blanning, p. 3). While factors like an aura of authority or a modern political
culture may contribute to success, the ability to do violence and visceral fear
are far more persuasive motivators. Frederick William knew that France had the
largest modern army in Europe and immense wealth to support a protracted war.
Power is not as intellectual a force as Blanning presents. So he depicts
Frederick as an enlightened participant in the public sphere without seeing how
his threat gave him control. He shows British government reasonably bending to
public opinion, without understanding that behind this civility loomed their
memory of Civil War, and numerous bloody revolts, which produced a taste for
compromise and stability.
When examining history, one must look forward as well as
backward from an event to understand it in context. The history of the public
sphere is one of a public applying pressure to authoritarian governments to
produce changes. The scope of Blanning’s book only shows the period of 1660 -
1789. So he neither sees back to the series of the aforementioned armed
conflicts in England, nor ahead to the results of public sphere pressure. The
history of British monarchical & aristocratic government is one of bending
so far that it was eventually bent-over. The UK gradually achieved full
suffrage, between petitions and revolts, because government eventually
accommodated over three centuries of pressure. In the German principalities
consistent pressure, memories of the French Revolution and occurrences like the
Revolution of 1848, eventually led to government concessions. Public opinion
favoring democracy, educated over years of legal and censored writing, along
with the Kaiser’s loss in World War I, produced Germany’s first republic. In
the long view, a persistent, inextinguishable public voice desiring equal
participation (along with the threat or actuality of violence), won in Europe.
Blanning’s failure to see the dominance of the bourgeoisie
in the public sphere is puzzling. Monarchs and aristocrats did write, and
create institutions, outside of the court. But the institutions they produced
were fairly exclusive. The author’s own statistics regarding European musical
events, show that middle class individuals attended middle class venues and
aristocrats attended aristocratic venues. When liberal aristocrats opened their
events to the populace, few subjects could afford tickets (Blanning, pp.
172-3). If institutions are not available to the public, they cannot impact the
public sphere. Concerning publicity and writing, aristocrats were a small
minority of the participants. Many of them supported ideas that would improve
conditions for the middle class. In general, public sphere publicity benefitted
the middle class and diminished aristocratic power. Saying that the public
sphere was not bourgeois is like saying that Black Lives Matter is not an
African American cause, because a minority of white people are involved.
Though Blanning fails to disprove Habermas with his notions,
that the public sphere was neither bourgeois nor antagonistic to the
traditional power structure, his study has a great deal of merit. His central thesis, quoted at the outset, remains intact. This
study is broader, though not deeper, than Habermas. He examines more nations,
showing how they avoided revolution through accommodation and usurpation of
public sphere vehicles. It is unfortunate that a writer, with “power” in his
title, does not understand how power over people is different from power with
people. But the author’s survey is thoughtful and coherent. He remains on-point
throughout a lengthy project. More importantly, one can understand him. As
Blanning observes, “even native German speakers have difficulty deciphering
[Habermas’s] tortuous prose” (Blanning, p. 6). Readers of English who have
found translations of Habermas to be a scrum of concepts, should pick-up The
Culture of Power. Habermas may have had an original and brilliant theory,
but Blanning explains and exemplifies it with superior clarity. Able writing,
coupled with broader application, make this work a valuable contribution to
history and public sphere theory.
Blanning, TCW. The Culture of Power and the Power of
Culture. Old Regime Europe 1660-1789